Thus, persons are here not identical to a body or a brain; neither are persons identifiable with a set of memory or character states; instead, persons are identified with a particular perspective. But as Weirob is keen to point out, we aren't justified in making such claims of correlation if we don't have some other, independent way of showing that souls are around whenever we think they are.
This is not to say that materialists affirming a body view have no answers to these challenges, but simply that these challenges remain significant worries worthy of consideration.
I merely observe that they can provide no principle of personal identity. The resulting person may remember having had red wine last week and liking the tagliatelle al ragu, but this person would only seem to be me. Weirob objects that we cannot judge from the sameness of psychological characteristics that we have the sameness of soul.
Perhaps I had a childhood dream of skiing in the Alps, and much later, I came to believe that I had actually done so. The New Catholic Encyclopedia observes that the ancient Hebrews did not think of man as being composed of a material body and an immaterial soul.
Definition of Survival This position is less defensible, Weirob thinks, because this makes identity dependent on something entirely external to the agent. But if we can't tell the difference from actually remembering and seeming to remember, how are we to tell the difference when we are imagining that the former, and not the latter, situation is possible.
Weirob challenges this in the following way: To say you are your brain because you use your brain to think is similar to someone saying that my hand picks up a stick, so I am my hand.
Olson defends it in The Human Animal: In BJ, an exact psychological copy of a brain is made even though the copy may differ from the original in some physical respects.
To this, C responds by saying that of course the memories are caused in the right way since they are traces made in a brain by the usual perceptual and physiological processes, and that brain has now simply been transferred to another body where it continues to work normally.
But now consider a different person, Bartholomew, who wakes up one day after having had surgery on his brain. The problem, Weirob summarizes, is that by the very nature of what a soul is--i. But personal identity is not at all mysterious. Real memories are apparent memories that are caused in the right way.
Personal Identity can be broken down into three areas: There are also other important distinctions between this not-so-simple simple view and more standard simple views. If this is right [so the argument would go] then survival after death is possible because even though your body dies, you--your soul--lives on.
Is the survivor of the BJ process identical with me. Since God is all-powerful, it can't be that He is limited in how many copies of people he can make, so He must not be able to create someone identical to Weirob.
This challenge is easily met. Being God, couldn't he have also--if he had wanted to--created a second sort of being. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. For responses to them, I refer you to the literature listed at the end.
Therefore, the memory theory is better to define personal identity than the soul theory. I give you these souls. Qualitative identity, on the other hand, is the relation that many things can have to many others, provided that they have the same properties in common.
Perry's book A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality deals with standard problems in the theory of personal identity in the form of a dialogue between a mortally wounded university professor, Gretchen Weirob, and her two friends, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen.
Consider Algernon, who lives a long life full of memories of himself in his family, in school, and at work.
A dialogue on personal identity and immortality. 1. How does Gretchen criticize Sam’s proposal (in the “First Night”) that the same person is present on two different occasions just in case (or, exactly when) the same soul is present on those two occasions?
John Perry, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality (not “Immorality”!) Gretchen Weirob (philosophy teacher, atheist, materialist, empiricist). In this paper, I offer an explication of John Perry’s arguments on pages of his Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. In this excerpt from the dialogue, the two primary characters, Miller and Weirob, engage in discussion dealing with the connection between memory, identity, and survival.
John Perry Argument Reconstruction-A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, p. If identity is imaginable, then identity is possible.
(from 5) 8. Survival is identity with a future person. (P) (Because this argument is a dialogue, it deviates from the. Essay Personal Identity Personal Identity can be broken down into three areas: 1.) Body 2.) Memory and 3.) Soul.
In John Perry's "A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality" these composing aspects of personal identity are discussed at length.
In the reading and class discussions the body was defined clearly as a part of one's person, even alluded to at times as a "prison" in which one. Essay Personal Identity Personal Identity can be broken down into three areas: 1.) Body 2.) Memory and 3.) Soul.
In John Perry's "A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality" these composing aspects of personal identity are discussed at length. In the reading and class discussions the body was defined clearly as a part of one's person, even alluded to at times as a "prison" in which one.A dialogue on personal identity and immortality essay